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Abstract
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ing model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bar-
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icy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980’s
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This paper studies the impact of product market deregulations on labor markets, with spe-
cial emphasis on the Carter/Reagan deregulation of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
There has been quite some interest recently in the impact of product market institutions
on labor markets. However, the focus of this literature has been to use differences in US
and European product market regulation to try to explain the divergent performance of US
and European labor markets over the 1980’s and 90’s. One obstacle faced by this literature
is that the presence of a multitude of rigidities (and attempts at reform) in European labor
markets makes it difﬁcult to disentangle the roles of product and labor market institutions
in accounting for high European unemployment rates. In contrast, the US labor market is
both highly ﬂexible and its institutions did not undergo any substantial reform during the
period of interest. This allows us to focus only on changes in product market regulation,
while holding labor market institutions constant.
Consider the graph of HP-trend unemployment rates in Figure 1.1 US unemployment
rates began trending downward in the early 1980’s, falling from a peak of 7.6 % in 1982
to only 5.0 % in 2000. At the same time, the only signiﬁcant change in US labor market
institutions - the 1996 welfare reform - took place after most of the gains in unemployment
had already been realized. Welfare reform was implemented between September 1996 and
July 1997, and unemployment in 1996 had already fallen to 5.4 %.2 The deregulation of US
product markets runs parallel to this decrease in unemployment, as shown by the OECD
data on product market regulation plotted in Figure 1. This, together with the fact that
deregulation took place around the time of the trend reversal in unemployment, makes it
worth investigating whether product market deregulation could explain what has widely
been termed the ’employment miracle’ (Krueger and Pischke, 1997).
Indeed, there is some amount of empirical evidence to support the link between prod-
uct market regulation and labor markets. At a micro level, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)
examine the impact of French legislation3, which regulated entry into retailing. They ﬁnd
that those regions (departements)which restrictedentry more strongly, experiencedslower
rates of job growth. At the cross-country macro level, Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000),
using an OECD index of the degree of product market regulation, also report a negative
relationship between their countrywide regulation measure and employment. Fonseca, et.
al. (2001) show that their index of entry barriers is negatively correlated with employment
and positively correlated with unemployment rates. However, the high degree of correla-
tion between labor and product market regulation documented in Nicoletti, Scarpetta and
Boylaud (2000) makes it difﬁcult to disentangle the effects of each type of regulation in a
cross-country setup.
The main contributions of this paper are both quantitative and theoretical. Our main
quantitative contribution is to show that the effect of product market deregulation on un-
employment is surprisingly weak. In our baseline model, calibrated to match stylized facts
of the US labor market, we ﬁnd that increasing product market regulation from 1998 to
1978 levels can account for an increase of less than two tenth of a percentage point of un-
employment, from 5.1% in 1998 to 5.24% in 1978. Our ﬁndings are highly robust to our
choices of parameters and calibration targets.
On the theoretical side, we specify a dynamic general equilibrium model which com-
bines monopolistic competition in the goods market with fully-microfounded unemploy-
ment arising from Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching frictions and individual wage bar-
gaining betweenmultiple-worker ﬁrms andworkers. We identify two countervailing chan-
nels by which product market competition affects unemployment: the ﬁrst-principles out-
put expansion effect and the overhiring effect. From ﬁrst principles, ﬁrms with monopoly
1We emphasize that these are trend unemployment rates, whose business cycle component has been ﬁltered
out.
2In fact, one might argue that the immediate transitory effect of welfare reform should have been to increase
unemployment, as welfare recipients were pushed into the labor market.
3Loi Royer of 1974
1power maximize proﬁts by restricting output with respect to its full-competition level. As
competition increases, proﬁt-maximizing output expands, and along with it the demand
for labor. This in turn implies a greater rate of vacancy creation,which leads to a lower rate
of unemployment. The second channel is the countervailing overhiring effect, which arises
due to the interplay of imperfect competition and individual bargaining in multi-worker
ﬁrms.
First, note that the assumptions of multiple worker ﬁrms and individual bargaining are
sensible ones to model changes in product market competition in the US economy. Under
perfect competition in goods markets and constant returns to scale, the number and size of
ﬁrms is indeterminate, so the one-worker ﬁrm assumption is innocuous. Undermonopolis-
tic competition, however, ﬁrm size is determinate, and varies according to the competition
faced by the ﬁrm, making a multiple-worker setup preferable. Consistent with stylized
facts of the US labor market, we also assume an ’employment at will’ framework in which
workers bargain individually with ﬁrms and ﬁrms cannot commit to long-term contracts.
In such a setting, ﬁrst analyzed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a), the ﬁrm may choose
to renegotiate the wage at any time with any worker, effectively making every worker the
marginal worker. It is important to note that such a setup is the natural extension of paying
marginal products to a framework with bargaining.
When every worker is the marginal worker, a hiring externality of the type ﬁrst de-
scribed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a) can arise. When marginal revenue product is
decreasing (as it is under imperfect competition), hiring an additional worker depresses
the wages of all workers. This hiring externality gives ﬁrms an incentive to overhire4, that
is to hire workers beyond the point at which employment costs are recouped by marginal
revenue product. The incentive to overhire is strongest when monopoly power is highest
(i.e. when marginal revenue product is most steeply decreasing). As competition increases,
overhiring is diminished, placing downward pressure on vacancy creation and counteract-
ing the output expansion effect. Hence, neglecting this second overhiring channel might
lead one to overestimate the potential beneﬁts to product market reform.
Relatively little previous theoretical work has analyzed whether and how product mar-
ket rigidities may affect equilibrium labor market outcomes. Nickell (1999) provides an
insightful overview of early work which is either partial equilibrium or employing some
form of collective bargaining. Recent important contributions are the papers of Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) and Fonseca et. al. (2001), both of which ﬁnd unemployment to be
increasing in the the degree of product market regulation. Fonseca et. al. (2001) focuses on
the impact of entry barriers on the decision to become an entrepreneur or a worker, ﬁnding
that entry barriers can indeed lead to lower rates of entrepreneurship and hence job cre-
ation. However, in their setup, those ﬁrms which have overcome the barriers to entry then
face perfect competition. In contrast, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) study labor market
outcomes in a model with monopolistic competition but with a more stylized labor-market
setting. In a similar vein, Spector (2004) studies the effects of changes in the intensity of
product market competition in a partial equilibrium model with capital and concludes that
product-market and labor-market regulations tend to reinforce each other. The latter two
papers consider static or two-period setups.
In theoretical terms, our paperis most closely relatedto Stole andZwiebel (1996,1996a),
Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), and Cahuc et al. (2004). Smith (1999) and Cahuc
et al. (2004) present models with multiple-worker ﬁrms and individual bargaining with
decreasing returns to scale, which also leads to an overhiring effect. Cahuc and Wasmer
(2001) also illustrate that overhiring is not an issue under perfect competition and constant
returns to scale, because marginal revenue product is constant. In addition, using a model
without search frictions, Rotemberg (2000) argues that individual bargaining can lead to
wages which are less procyclical than their neoclassical counterparts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 characterizes short and long-run equilibrium, and presents analytic results on the
4We discuss social efﬁciency in detail in section5.
2impact of product market competition on labor market equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on
quantitative analysis, and examines the ability of product market deregulation to account
for the decline in US trend unemployment during the 80’s and 90’s. Section 5 explores the
constrained efﬁciency properties of our model, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
In this section we present the basic general equilibrium model. Its main elements are mo-
nopolistic competition in the goods marketand Mortensen-Pissarides-stylematching in the
labor market. Our innovation lies in deﬁning and solving the multi-worker ﬁrm’s problem
under monopolistic competition and individual bargaining. The households’ problems are
standard. We restrict our analysis to the steady state.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework (e.g. Pis-
sarides, 2000). Unemployed workers u and vacancies v are converted into matches by
a constant returns to scale matching function5 m(u,v)=s·uηv1−η. Deﬁning labor market
tightness as θ ≡ v
u, the ﬁrm meets unemployed workers at rate q(θ)=sθ−η, while the un-
employed workers meet vacancies at rate θq(θ)=sθ1−η.
Workers and ﬁrms are identical so that all jobs are identical. For each worker, the value
of employment is given by VE, which satisﬁes6:




where χ is the total separation rate, w denotes the per period real wage, andVU the value of
being unemployed. Firms andworkers mayseparateeitherbecausethe matchis destroyed,
which occurs with probability ˜ χ or because the ﬁrm has exited, which occurs with proba-
bility δ. We assume that these two sources of separation are independent, so that the total
separation probability is given by χ =   χ+δ−  χδ. Explicit ﬁrm exit is incorporated mainly
for quantitative reasons. If ﬁrms were counterfactually inﬁnitely lived, then the impact of
a given level of entry costs would be greatly understated, since ﬁrms could amortize those
entry costs over an inﬁnite lifespan.





where b denotes real unemployment beneﬁts.
2.1.2 Monopolistic Competition in the Goods Market
Households are both consumers and workers. As consumers they are risk neutral in the
aggregate consumption good. Agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over a continuum of












5As is quite standard in the literature, s denotes a scaling parameter which serves to bring matching rates
within the [0,1] interval, while η denotes the elasticity of matches with respect to the number of unemployed.
6We assume that all payments are made at the end of a period so that our value functions in discrete time










Pdiwhere In denotes the real income of household
n and ci,n is household n’s consumption of good i. In order to focus the dynamics on the


















1−σ is the inverse shadow price
of wealth, typically interpreted as a price index. Equation (4) is the standard monopolistic-
competition demand function with elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods
given by −σ.
2.2 Multiple-worker Firms
Firms are monopolistically competitive. We abandon the one-worker-per-ﬁrm assumption
in favor of a more general framework with multiple-worker ﬁrms. Under perfect compe-
tition in goods markets and constant returns to scale, the one-worker ﬁrm assumption is
harmless, since the number and size of ﬁrms is indeterminate7. Under monopolistic com-
petition, however, ﬁrm size is determinate, and varies according to the demand elasticity σ
faced by the ﬁrm, among others. The only way to vary ﬁrm size with a given technology
is to vary the amount of labor employed either on the intensive margin or on the exten-
sive margin.8 Consistent with stylized facts we assume that ﬁrms adjust employment by
varying the number of workers [extensive margin] rather than the number of hours per
worker.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future proﬁts. Firm i’s state variable is the
number of workers currently employed, Hi. The ﬁrm’s key decision is the number of va-
cancies. Firms open as many vacancies as necessary to hire in expectation the desired
number of workers next period, while taking into account that the real cost to opening a


























production function: Yi = AHi (7)
transition function: H 
i =( 1−  χ)Hi+q(θ)vi (8)
wage curve: w(Hi) (9)
where the wage curve is the result of individual bargaining as described in section 2.3.1.
The ﬁrm’s problem takes into account that a measure δ of ﬁrms exits each period.
The ﬁrst order condition states that the marginal value of an additional worker must











7This argument is formalized in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). Smith (1999) examines individual bargaining in
a multi-worker ﬁrm under perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale, the other case in which the one-
worker-per-ﬁrm assumption breaks down.
8In a model with capital, ﬁrms could also vary output by varying only the amount of capital employed. In
order to maintain an optimal capital-labor ratio, however, ﬁrms would also generally adjust by varying labor as
well.

























Firms price their goods by taking a constant markup σ
σ−1 on the marginal cost of producing
the good (the term in curly brackets). The ﬁrst two terms of the marginal cost are standard,
representingunit labor cost and annuitizedsearchcost. The third term, Hi
∂w
∂Hi,r e ﬂects ﬁrms’
correct anticipation that the result of wage bargaining will depend upon the number of
workers hired. In section 2.3 we will connect this ﬁnal term to the hiring externality. In
addition, it is useful to note that (11) is an implicit labor demand expression that relates the
ﬁrm’s optimal employment choice to the wage.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
In this section we describe the wage bargaining, allowing us to generate wage curves and
complete the description of labor demand. In the neo-classical framework, workers are
paid their marginal products. The natural extension to a bargaining environment is the in-
dividual bargaining setup introduced by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).The key assumption of
theindividualbargainingframeworkisthatﬁrmscannot commit tolong-termemployment
contracts, and may renegotiate wages with each worker at any time, making each worker
effectively the marginal worker. The ﬁrm’s inability to commit is the key characteristic of
the ’employment at will’ environment dominant in US labor markets. Also, individual bar-
gaining involves bargaining over wages only, since an individual worker can only deprive
the ﬁrm of her own marginal product, which does not give the worker sufﬁcient leverage
to negotiate hiring.
We believe that this is the appropriate bargaining setup for our model for two further
reasons. First, on theoretical grounds, individual bargaining is the natural extension of
the Mortensen-Pissarides framework to multi-worker ﬁrms, because it ensures that Nash-
bargaining over wages is fully microfounded. In particular, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) show
that individual bargaining may be understood as a Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1986)
alternating offer game. Hence the wage curve (15) can be obtained either by fully modeling
the pairwise bargaining structure, or by solving a standard generalized Nash bargaining
problem9. Secondly, we later calibrate to US labor markets, in which "employment at will"
is dominant, and which are hence better characterized by individual than by collective
bargaining.10 In the time period we consider, between 78and90%of privatesector workers
were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, according to CPS data reported in
Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).
2.3.1 Individual Bargaining Solution
Under individual bargaining, the ﬁrm’s outside option is not remaining idle, but rather
producing with one worker less. The crucial point of the individual bargaining framework











9We know from e.g. Gul (1987) that symmetric Nash products can be used to compute the Shapley value.
Following footnote 18 of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) but using a generalized sharing rule (with weight β for workers
and (1−β) for ﬁrms), it is straightforward to derive a wage curve equivalent to our equation (12).
10In a companion paper, we compare our results to those derived under a collective bargaining framework, and
show that assuming collective bargaining strengthens the impact of product market competition on unemploy-
ment and wages substantially.
5To obtain an expression for ﬁrm’s surplus, take the envelope condition of the ﬁrm’s prob-
lem (5), and recall that the ﬁrst order condition (10) implies that ∂VJ



















Substituting the expressions for worker’s and ﬁrm’s surplus (13) into the ﬁrst order



















Equation (15) is the wage curve under individual bargaining.11 We can now substitute out
for the Hi
∂w















Equation (16) can also be interpreted as a job creation condition. As expected, it is down-
ward sloping, both in the amount of labor demanded Hi and in labor market tightness θ.
2.4 Firm-level Equilibrium
In this section, we ﬁnd the ﬁrm’s optimal employment-wage pair when it takes the aggre-
gate variables (labor market tightness θ and competition σ) as given.
Deﬁnition 1 Firm-Level Equilibrium
A ﬁrm-level equilibrium is deﬁned as a pair of real wages and ﬁrm-level employment Hi which
satisﬁes both labor demand (16) and the individual bargaining wage curve (15), taking aggregate
variables (θ,σ,I) as given.
This ﬁrm-level equilibrium is found at the intersection of labor demand (16) and the


























Equation (17) expresses ﬁrm-level employment implicitly, while equation (18) gives the
ﬁrm-level equilibrium wage. Also note that although ﬁrm-level equilibrium wages do not
depend explicitly on σ, they will depend on competition indirectly, via equilibrium labor
market tightness θ.
2.5 Hiring Externality
The individual bargaining solution presented above displays a hiring externality of the
type ﬁrst explored in partial equilibrium by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). To see this, ﬁrst re-
call that in the standardone-worker-one-ﬁrm setup, marginal (revenue) product is equated
to the cost of employing a worker in equilibrium. In our case, however, this equilibrium
11The differential equation is solved in appendix D
6relationship is modiﬁed by the presence of an overhiring term. Speciﬁcally, rearranging the


















      
wage + hiring cost
(19)
Equation (19) equates the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue product to the cost of employing a






σ <1expressesthe factthatﬁrms optimally hireworkers beyond
the point at which employment costs can be recouped by the worker’s marginal product.
Firms are willing to employ workers whose marginal revenue product is not high enough
to cover their employment costs, because hiring these workers confers an added non-MRP
beneﬁtt oﬁrms. This addedbeneﬁt orhiring externalityarisesbecausehiring moreworkers
when MRP is declining serves to depress the wages of all workers. This can be seen from














      
employment cost of one worker
+ Hi
∂w
∂Hi       
hiring externality term
(20)
The hiring externality term represents the wage impact of adding an extra worker, multi-
plied by the total number of workers. The negative hiring externality term reﬂects the fact
that adding a worker depresses the wages of all workers, since all workers are treated as














From (21), it is easy to see that the hiring externality is strongest when competition σ is
low and worker bargaining power β is high. In the perfect competition limit, as σ → ∞, the
hiring externality disappears because MRP is constant. The hiring externality is also zero
if worker bargaining power β equals zero.
The reason that overhiring is increasing in monopoly power is simple: The stronger is
monopoly power, the more steeply decreasing is marginal revenue product, so hiring an
additional worker depresses wages more strongly. Hence, monopoly power increases the
size of the hiring externality and drives up overhiring. In this way, the hiring external-
ity works to dampen the negative ﬁrst order effects of monopoly power on employment.
When monopoly power increases, the ﬁrst principles effect leads ﬁrms to decrease out-
put and hence employment. Under high monopoly power, however, ﬁrms’ incentive to
overhire in order to depress wages is relatively strong, and serves to counteract the ﬁrst
principles effect. In some sense, then, overhiring ameliorates the negative output- and
employment-restricting effects of monopoly power. Just how much the overhiring effect is
ableto counteractthese ﬁrst principles effectsofmonopoly poweris aquantitative question
which we address in section 4.
Overhiring is also increasing in workers’ bargaining power β. This is intuitive, since the
on average higher wages which accompany greater worker bargaining power give the ﬁrm
an added incentive to depress wages.
In section 5, we will show formally that the hiring externality leads ﬁrms to hire more
than the constrained socially efﬁcient number of workers. This is analogous to the over-
hiring results in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and Smith (1999). In Smith (1999) and Stole
and Zwiebel (1996a), however, the source of decreasing MRP is not monopoly power but
12This breakdown is analogous to that Cahuc et. al. (2004).
7decreasing returns to scale in production. Also, our ﬁnding that the overhiring effect dis-
appears under perfect competition is in line with the results of Cahuc and Wasmer (2001),
who show that the hiring externality is absent in a model with constant returns to scale and
perfect competition.
3 General Equilibrium
We proceed to ﬁnd equilibrium in two steps. First, we ﬁnd the short run general equilib-
rium, which amounts to ﬁnding the equilibrium degree of labor market tightness θ while
holding the degree of competition σ facing the ﬁrms constant. This will allow us to obtain
expressions for all equilibrium variables as functions of competition σ. In a second step,
we will introduce entry costs, which will serve to endogenize the degree of competition in
the economy. This last equilibrium will be referred to as long-run general equilibrium.
3.1 Short Run General Equilibrium
Now, we determine the short-run general equilibrium, taking as given the degree of com-
petition. In our setting, this is equivalent to pinning down all equilibrium variables as
functions of the degree of competition σ. This will allow us to determine the impact of in-
creasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages. We assume a continuum
of identical ﬁrms that are uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Deﬁnition 2 Short-run General Equilibrium
A short-run general equilibrium is deﬁned for given σ and parameters
(β,b,ΦV,δ,χ,r,A) as a value of θ which:
(i) is a ﬁrm-level equilibrium satisfying (17)-(18)





Substituting in from (17), using (6) and (7) to substitute out for Hi and getting a closed



























The short-run general equilibrium condition (23) is monotonically increasing in θ, so that





When the economy approaches full competition [as σ → ∞], (24) reduces to the standard
condition A > b that workers’ productivity be greater in employment than in unemploy-
ment.
Equation (23) is key, since it relatesthe degree of competition σ to short-run equilibrium
labor market tightness θ. Once we have θ(σ), we can obtain the short-run equilibrium





8The remainder of equilibrium variables are found as follows. First, note that equilibrium







Given the total number of agents in the economy N, we can ﬁnd equilibrium aggregate
employment as H(σ)=N[1−u(σ)]. We will ﬁnd it convenient to normalize N = 1. With
H(σ) in hand, we can ﬁnd aggregate output and subsequently the equilibrium quantity of
good i, and of course short-run equilibrium employment per ﬁrm Hi(σ) 13and price Pi(σ),
all in terms of the given degree of competition. A complete list of all short-run equilibrium
equations can be found in appendix D.
3.1.1 Comparative Statics I: Varying Competition
The characterization of short-term equilibrium allows us to examine the qualitative im-
pact of varying the degree of competition σ on short-term equilibrium unemployment and
wages. We identify two main channels by which an increase in competition affectsemploy-
ment andunemployment: (1)theﬁrst principles output-expansion channel, which has been
discussed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and (2) the hiring externality channel, which
is unique to our analysis of product market deregulation. Via the output expansion chan-
nel, increased competition leads to increased employment and decreased unemployment,
while the hiring externality channel works in the opposite direction.
Expanding equation (23) allows us to examine these two channels formally:
A =
σ−β
σ       
(overhiring <1)
σ

















The output expansion term is simply the markup of the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm.
The greater is monopoly power, the greater is the markup σ
σ−1, the smaller is equilibrium
tightness θ. By the Beveridge curve, equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in tight-
ness, so that greater monopoly power leads to higher unemployment. The overhiring term
counteracts the output expansion term. The greater is monopoly power, the smaller is the
overhiring term, the greater is equilibrium tightness θ and the lower is unemployment.
These two effects are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the contribution of the overhir-
ing and output expansion effects to equilibrium tightness. The solid line shows the impact
of competition on equilibrium labor market tightness θthat is solely due to the output ex-
pansion effect, that is, when the hiring externality has been shut down by setting
σ−β
σ = 1.
Accordingly, the dashed line shows the impact of competition on θ that can be attributed
solely to the hiring externality, i.e. when the output expansion effect has been shut down
by setting σ
σ−1 = 1.
The combined effect of output expansion and overhiring is given by
σ−β
σ−1 >1, so that the




σ−1, the increase in unemployment is smaller than it would
be in the absenceof the overhiring effect. By just how much overhiring dampens the impact
of monopoly power on unemployment is a quantitative question which we will address in
the next section.
This comparative static result for short-term equilibrium is summarized in Lemma 1
and Proposition 2. All proofs are found in appendix A.
Lemma 1 Short-run equilibrium labor market tightness is a strictly increasing function of demand
elasticity σ.
13Note also that normalizing the mass of ﬁrms to one equalizes aggregate and ﬁrm-level employment: H(σ)=
Hi(σ).
9Proposition 2 In short-run equilibrium:
(i) unemployment is strictly decreasing in competition σ,
(ii) wages are strictly increasing in competition σ.
Proposition 2 also establishes that equilibrium wages are increasing in the degree of
competition. This conclusion is the opposite of that drawn by the recent literature on
wages and the sharing of monopoly rents (e.g. van Reenen, 1996). The source of the dis-
parity is that the rent-sharing papers typically look at only one isolated industry, while we
consider broader increases in competition which affect all industries at once. The general
equilibrium effect of greater competition is to increase vacancies and tightness in all sec-
tors, making it easier for unemployed workers to ﬁnd new jobs. This increases the value of
the worker’s reservation utility rVU, thereby improving the worker’s bargaining position
and increasing his/her wage, as illustrated by equation (26) in conjunction with Lemma 1.






1−δ, is also increasing in competi-
tion. The reason is that in equilibrium the value of the marginal worker is equal to the cost
of searching for him/her, which must increase with θ. Hence, equilibrium wages are in-
creasing in competition.This is similar to the positive wage effect of competition found by
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). It is also consistent with data on labor shares (simply com-
puted as employee compensation over GDP) and entry regulation, as illustrated in Figure
4.
3.1.2 Comparative Statics II: Varying Parameters
Proposition 3 summarizes the impact of varying parameters on short-run equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Effects of parameters on equilibrium θ and unemployment
In short-run equilibrium:
(i) labor market tightness θ is decreasing in the parameters b, ΦV, r, δ, and   χ;
(ii) unemployment is increasing in the parameters b, ΦV, r, δ and   χ;
(iii) labor market tightness θ is decreasing in β and unemployment is increasing in β if either b <
ΦV
1−δθ or b ≥
ΦV















The results of parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 are standard for search and matching
models. Part (iii) merits comment. Unemployment’s reaction to an increase in workers’
bargaining power is standard, unless the degree of competition is very low. The intuition
is that higher workers’ bargaining power strengthens the overhiring effect, in the sense
that ∂2w
∂Hi∂β < 0 for given Hi and Pi. At very low levels of competition, the overhiring effect
discussed in section 2.3 is particularly strong. In this case, increasing bargaining power
strengthens the overhiring effect so much [i.e. increasing ﬁrms’ incentives to hire more
workers to depress wages], that the end result is lower unemployment.
3.2 Long-run General Equilibrium
Now we are ready to endogenize the degree of competition. In the long-run, ﬁrms may
enter each industry by paying a real entry cost ΦE and by posting enough vacancies to hire
the steady-state workforce. The details of ﬁrm entry and exit are as follows: Each period
a measure δ of ﬁrms exits, and is replaced by a measure δ of new entrants. New entrants
begin production immediately with their steady-state workforce. Hence, we assume that
entering ﬁrms know far enough in advance that they will be entering to complete all en-
try formalities. During this (these) pre-entry period(s) ﬁrms pay the entry cost and post
enough vacancies to hire their steady-state workforce.14 Entry by ﬁrms will continue until
14Note that it is not necessary to take the measure δ of pre-entry ﬁrms into account in aggregate income. They
do not yet produce and only incur vacancy costs. Hence the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and vacancy costs sum to zero.
10proﬁts net of entry costs within each industry have been competed down to zero. Hence,
free entry in the presence of barriers to entry leads to equilibrium demand elasticity σ∗,





The free entry condition (28) states that the entry cost must be amortized by proﬁts over
the ﬁrm’s expected lifespan. Since equilibrium proﬁts are decreasing in competition, free
entry forges a negative link between barriers to entry and the degree of competition in the
economy.15
Entry barriers may take two complementary forms, time and pecuniary costs. For 1997
we have detailed data on the number of business days it takes to set up a standardized
ﬁrm from the OECD as reported by Pissarides (2001) and on entry fees as a percentage of
per capita GDP from Djankov, et. al. (2002). We combine the two measures into a single
one by adding up the entry costs as a percentage of per capita annual GDP and the fraction
of a year which is lost to entry delay. This implicitly treats the entry delay as a loss of
the fraction of annual per capita GDP which would have been produced during that time
period.
Formally, total barriers to entry are found as:
ΦE (σ)=[ d+ f]·I(σ). (29)
where d is the regulatory delay in months and f are entry fees as a share of aggregate





Equation (30) closes the long-run equilibrium. It determines the endogenous degree of
competition σ∗ in long-run equilibrium by deﬁning a negative relationship between barri-
ers to entry and the degree of competition in long-run equilibrium.
3.3 Balanced Budget
For our quantitative experiments we augment the model to allow for unemployment ben-
eﬁts to be ﬁnanced by equal magnitude income and payroll taxes (τI,τP). The resulting
balanced budget condition is:
(τI +τP)w(1−u)=bu. (31)





















All other equilibrium equations under taxation and a balanced budget are presented in
appendix E.
15To forge an explicit link between barriers to entry and the number of ﬁrms, one may take two routes. First,
one may follow Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and assume that σ is an increasing function of the number of
ﬁrms. Alternatively, one may hold σ constant, and allow for n ﬁrms competing via Cournot in each industry. In
a previous version of this paper, we followed this second setup. Results are very similar to those of the simpler
setup presented here, and are available upon request.
114 Quantitative Results
We are now in a position to calibrate our model and approach our quantitative questions.
We ﬁrst explain in detail how we calibrate the basic model to match a set of labor market
data from the United States. Then, for this calibration we ask: What is the impact of in-
creasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages? In order to answer this
question, we run a policy experiment which is designed to assess whether the product
market deregulation of the late 1970’s and 1980’s could account for the decline in US un-
employment during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Finally, we go on to quantify the overhiring
effect.
4.1 Calibration
One model period is one month. All parameters are reported in Table 4.W eﬁrst calibrate
the model to US data in 1998. We use estimates from the literature to guide our choices
for the ﬁrst group of parameters. The bargaining power of workers, β, has recently been
estimated between 20%, (Cahuc, Gianella, Goux and Zylberberg, 2002) and 50% (Abowd
and Allain, 1996, Yashiv, 2001). Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) report η, the elasticity of
the matching function with respect to unemployment, to be in the range of [0.5;0.7]. We set
β = η = 0.5, thus choosing standard values and imposing the Hosios (1990) condition. For
simplicity, we normalize the level of technology A98 to unity. Our choice of 4.0 % for the
annualized real interest rate is standard, as our choice of the ﬂow utility of unemployment
b, which is consistent with a replacement rate of 50%.
We choose the remaining parameters to match some stylized labor market data for the
U.S. in 1998. Speciﬁcally, we replicate the 1998 HP-trend value for the unemployment rate
of 5.1%16 and set the job ﬁnding rate to be 0.45 following Shimer (2005). We normalize the
ﬁrm’s matching rate so that the vacancy duration is 4.2 months as in den Haan, Ramey and
Watson, (2000). Our choices for unemployment duration and vacancy duration restrict US
equilibrium labor market tightness to be θ = λw
λf = 1.89, where λw and λf are the matching
rates of workers and ﬁrms respectively.17 This ﬁgure looks high at ﬁrst glance. However,
before comparing it to standard one-worker ﬁrm models and data it is necessary to adjust
for the fact that ﬁrms open as many vacancies as necessary in order to fulﬁll their hiring
needs in expectation. If we multiply the equilibrium tightness θ with the ﬁrm matching
rate we ﬁnd a ratio of open jobs to unemployed of 45 %. The equality of tightness with the
job-ﬁnding rate is in line with the ﬁndings of Shimer (2005). Finally, the scaling parameter
of the matching function s must satisfy s = λw
θ1−η.
The exogenous total separation rate χ = 2.4 %, is pinned down by the Beveridge curve
in conjunction with our valuesfor unemployment and unemployment duration. We set δ=
0.8% , so that the monthly probability that a ﬁrm will cease to exist implies an annual ﬁrm
survival rate of 90.8 %. This is matches the average ﬁve-year survival probability reported
by Wagner (1994) and is in line with the four-year ﬁrm survival probabilities reported in
Mata and Portugal (1994), which imply monthly exit rates between 0.6 and 1.4 %.
We are left with a short-run equilibrium condition which relates the above-mentioned
parameters and variables to vacancy posting costs ΦV, and with a long-run equilibrium
condition (30) which relates ΦV to ﬁrm’s demand elasticity σ. We pin down σ by the entry
costs and the vacancy cost ΦV by the unemployment rate. We choose that level of vacancy
posting costs which leads to a long-run equilibrium U.S. equilibrium unemployment rate
of 5.1 %. This yields a value of ΦV = 0.24, so that hiring costs per worker are 1
λf ΦV = 1.01
units of output, which corresponds to slightly more than a worker’s monthly wage.
16We wish to concentrate on the long-run impact of regulation, abstracting from business cycle considerations.
Hence, we use the HP-trend value, in which the business cycle component has been ﬁltered out.
17Pinning down the value of θ does not fully describe short-run equilibrium, as long as some other variable is
left free. In our case, this variable will be ΦV.
12For 1997, we can use the detailed entry cost data reported in Table 1, resulting in entry
costs corresponding to 0.6 months of aggregate per capita income. For 1978 there is no
such entry cost data available. However, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001) have compiled an
index on product market regulation for a set of 21 countries whose starting date is 1978
and whose ending date is 1998. These 1998 and 1978 index values are displayed in Table 2
for the subset of 17 countries for which both the index and the detailed entry cost data are
available. In order to estimate US entry costs for 1978, we use the following ’triangulation’
procedure. We ﬁrst note that the correlation between Nicoletti’s index in 1998 and our
composite measure of entry costs is very high at 0.77. To estimate entry costs in 1978, we
run the following regression:
entry costs1997,i = α+β·regulation index1998,i+εi (33)
where i represents the country. We then combine the resulting regression coefﬁcients (re-
ported in Table 3) with Nicoletti’s index values for 1978 to obtain an estimate for 1978entry
costs of 5.2 months of aggregate per capita income.
Finally, our calibrations are for a balanced budget version of the model in which unem-
ployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by equal magnitude income and payroll taxes (τI,τP).I n
the 1998 US model economy, income and payroll taxes of 1.3 % are necessary to ﬁnance
unemployment beneﬁts.
4.2 Product Market Competition and the Labor Market
The results of this calibration are presented in Figure 5. The middle right panel shows that
proﬁts and the US entry costs for 1998 are equalized when demand elasticity is 81.4, which
corresponds to a markup of 0.6 %, while the upper right panel shows that long-run equi-
librium in 1978 occurs at a demand elasticity of 9.1, corresponding to a markup of 6.2 %.18
The upper left panel shows that unemployment could increase by maximally 2 percentage
points due to an increase in monopoly power to the highest amount which is consistent
with existenceof equilibrium. Realwage decreasesdueto increasesin monopoly power, on
the other hand, could be very substantial, as shown in the middle left hand panel of Figure
5. The lower panels show that most of the wage increases due to increases in competition
are due to improvements in the workers’ reservation utility. This in turn has its origins in
the increases in labor market tightness due to increased competition, which make it eas-
ier for workers to ﬁnd jobs when unemployed, increasing their reservation utility. Hence,
under individual bargaining there is little adjustment to monopoly power via equilibrium
unemployment (and hence output), but the impact on wages and proﬁts is substantial.
We note that the bulk of the impact of monopoly power on wages and unemployment
occurs under very low levels of demand elasticity. This is consistent with the empirical
results of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), who ﬁnd that most of the beneﬁts due to increased
competition come from the entry of the ﬁrst three to ﬁve competitors, with very little ben-
eﬁts accruing to further entry.
4.3 A Simple Policy Experiment
We now use the balanced budget version of the model to run a simple policy experiment,
in order to assess to what extent product market deregulation can account for the decline
in U.S. unemployment during the 80’s and 90’s. We do this by starting with the model cal-
ibrated to match US HP-trend labor market data in 1998,19 and then examining the impact
of changing the entry costs to reﬂect those of 1978. We emphasize that we calibrate to labor
18Since the model yields a US markup for 1998 which is quite small, we also present alternative calibrations in
which entry costs are factored up so that the US markup in 1998 are 5.0 % and 10.0 %. Details may be found in
section 4.4.2.
19Once again, we emphasize that we calibrate to labor market data from which the business cycle component
has been ﬁltered out.
13market data from which the business cycle component has been ﬁltered out, in order to
focus on the long-run impact of a change in product market regulation.
Results of the policy experiment are presented in Table 5. In the baseline calibration,
changes in product market regulation can only account for a surprisingly small change in
equilibrium unemployment. Raising entry costs nearly tenfold to their 1978 level leads
to a decrease in competition, causing markups to increase by a factor of 10, to 6.2 %, but
resulting in an increase in unemployment of only one-tenth of one percentage point. As a
result of the decrease in competition, unemployment increases only very slightly, from 5.1
% to 5.24 %. In contrast, in the data, trend unemployment increases from 5.1 % in 1998 to
7.1 % in 1978, as shown in Figure 1.
The reason for the weak impact of product market institutions on unemployment rates
can be traced to the interaction of the two countervailing effects, output expansion and the
hiring externality. The hiring externality inherent in the individual bargaining setup effec-
tively counteracts much of the detrimental impact of monopoly power on unemployment.
4.4 Robustness
We now proceed to check the robustness of our quantitative results. We ﬁrst vary the
calibration targets for the job-ﬁlling and job-ﬁnding rates and for the replacement rate,
the monthly rate of ﬁrm exit, and the matching elasticity η and bargaining power β.W e
ﬁnd that our choice of these parameter values is innocuous and has only negligible effects
on the results that we report. We also consider the possibility that our entry cost data is
systematically underestimating barriers to entry, and recalibrate the model to match 5.0 %
and 10.0 % markups. We ﬁnd that the only way to generate a substantial impact of entry
costs on unemployment is by multiplying both the 1998 entry costs and the gap between
1978 and 1998 entry costs by a factor of 6. Increasing the difference in entry costs by this
margin, however, leads to counterfactually large movements in wages.
4.4.1 Setup
We take the calibration to the U.S.economy in 1998as a starting point and vary the variable
of interest over a wide range of values. For each of these values we recalibrate the model
to still ﬁt the remaining baseline calibration targets of a 5.1% unemployment rate, 45 % job-
ﬁnding rate, 4.2 months vacancy duration and a replacement rate of 0.50. We then repeat
the policy experiment and report the results.
4.4.2 Results
We ﬁrst examine the impact of varying the calibration targets for the job-ﬁnding rate. Our
alternative targets match the 1998 HP-trend values for the mean and median unemploy-
ment durations, leading to job-ﬁnding rates of 0.31 and 0.67. As shown in Table 6, the
impact on the policy experiment results are barely perceptible. Similarly, the results of the
policy experiment are highly robust to varying the job-ﬁlling rate targets, as reported in
Table 7.
Next, we vary the target value for the replacement rate widely, increasing it to 70% and
decreasing it to 30%. Once again, we ﬁnd that the results of our policy experiment are very
robust to the choice of replacement rate. The impact of increasing the replacement rate
to a counterfactually high 70% would be to decrease the 1978 unemployment rate by one
one-hundredth of a percentage point, as shown in Table 8.20
Our results are also quite robust to the choice of the ﬁrm exit rate δ and the matching
elasticity/bargaining power parameters η = β. Table 9 shows that increasing the monthly
20Note that we recalibrate ΦV,1998 to match a 5.1 % unemployment rate in 1998. Otherwise, the higher replace-
ment rate would shift both 1998 and 1978 unemployment rates upwards, while leaving the gap between the two
(our variable of interest) nearly unaltered.
14ﬁrm exit rate by one-tenth of a percentage point (causing the annual ﬁrm exit rate to in-
crease by about one percentage point) leads to an increase in the unemployment change
generated by our policy experiment of only about one one-hundredth of a percentage
point, a negligible quantity. Table 10 repeats the policy experiment for alternative values
of matching elasticity and bargaining power.21 We vary η = β between 0.30, at the lower
bound of matching elasticity estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), and
0.72, as recently estimated for US data by Shimer (2005). Increasing η = β to 0.72 causes the
unemployment impact to decline further, to less than one tenth of one percentage point,
while decreasing η = β to 0.30 causes the unemployment impact of the decrease in product
market regulation to increase somewhat to two tenths of a percentage point. The reason is
that decreasing η increases the curvature of the Beveridge curve, increasing the impact of
a given change in labor market tightness on unemployment. In addition, the strength of
the overhiring effect is increasing in β, so that decreasing bargaining power will allow the
output expansion effect to come out more strongly. Nonetheless, the quantitative impact of
varying η and β is quite small.
Finally, one possible criticism of our calibration approach is that the resulting markups
are quite small, while it is only under the high markups associated with a great deal of
monopoly power that competition can have any noticeable impact on unemployment. (cf.
Figure 5). Although there is some evidence that markups and proﬁts are indeed close to
zero (cf. Basu and Fernald (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1995)), we do wish to
ensure that our results are robust to markups in the range of 5 to 10 %. In order to generate
such higher markups, we must scale up the entry costs. We do this in two ways. First, we
add the same constant γa to entry costs in 1998 and 1978. We interpret γa as representing
some other types of barriers to entry which have remained constant over time. We also
factor up the entry costs by multiplying both the entry costs in 1998 and 1978 by the same
constant γm. We interpret γm as representing some other types of barriers to entry which
are proportional to the entry costs captured in the data. The main difference between the
additive and multiplicative scaling up of entry costs is that the additive approachkeeps the
differencebetween entry costs at 1998and 1978constant, while the multiplicative approach
also factors up that gap by γm.
The results of calibrating to markups of 5 and 10 % are reported in Tables 11 and 12.
Our results arehighly robust to adding a constant term γa to entry costs at both dates, as the
unemployment impact in the policy experiment is virtually unchanged. Multiplying entry
costs at each date by a constant γm which is sufﬁciently large so as to generate 5 and 10 %
markups in 1998 does affect the policy experiment results substantially. When γm =3.42,s o
that the equilibrium markup in 1998is 5.0%, the impactof the productmarketderegulation
is still only about one half of one percentage point. When γm = 6.1, so that the equilibrium
markup in 1998 is 10.0 %, we ﬁnd that the impact on unemployment of a product market
deregulation rises to over one full percentage point. Although this might prima facie be
taken as evidence that a product market deregulation could have been responsible for a
non-negligible portion of the decrease in unemployment over the 80’s and 90’s, there are
two important reasonsto shun this interpretation. First, obtaining a10.0%markup involves
not only multiplying the level of entry costs by a factor of six, it also involves multiplying
the change in entry costs between 1998 and 1978 by a factor of six. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, the relatively large increase in unemployment is accompanied by very
large and counterfactual wage changes. In particular, the real wage would have to have
increased by more than 50% between 1978 and 1998. Hence, we conclude that there is no
reasonable calibration of the model that allows us to obtain a large impact of entry costs on
unemployment.
To sum up, our reportedresultthat increasing the regulationof entry to the U.S.product
market to 1978 levels has only negligible employment consequences is consistent with a
wide array of choices for our calibration targets and parameters and is by no means a
21We impose the Hosios condition that η = β throughout. In our setting, the Hosios condition is necessary but
not sufﬁcient for efﬁciency, as shown in the following section.
15special case.
4.4.3 Quantifying Overhiring
In the policy experiment, we saw that the impact of monopoly power on unemployment
was surprisingly small. In order to assess which role the hiring externality is playing in
counteracting the ﬁrst principles output expansion effect of increasing competition, we
proceed to quantify the overhiring effect. To do this, we use the decomposition of equation
(19) in order examine the quantitative consequences of shutting down the hiring external-
ity. We ﬁnd the equilibrium in the absence of overhiring by setting the overhiring term
σ−β
σ = 1, which guarantees that ﬁrm-level equilibrium equates marginal revenue product
and employment cost [wages plus hiring costs], as would be the case in a standard one-
worker-ﬁrm matching model. The baseline results are plotted in Figure 6. The top panel
compares the unemployment rate when the overhiring effect is operative and when it is
shut down, while the bottom panel plots the corresponding difference in unemployment
rates. Clearly, at very high levels of monopoly power the overhiring effect leads to reduc-
tions of unemployment of up to ﬁve full percentage points.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the impact of overhiring on net wages. Although
the source of the overhiring effect is individual ﬁrms’ desire to depress wages, the aggre-
gate effect of the hiring externality is to increase wages. The reason is that the expanded
hiring and the posting of more vacancies makes it easier for workers to ﬁnd jobs, increasing
their reservation utility and thereby boosting their equilibrium wages.
Analogous to the robustness results presented in the previous subsection, the only pa-
rameters which have any perceptible impact on the strength of the overhiring effect is the
matching elasticity η and bargaining power β. Figure 7 compares unemployment rates
with and without overhiring for values of η = β ranging from 0.30 to 0.75. The impact of
overhiring on unemployment becomes progressively stronger as η = β increases, as was to
be expected since the gap between employment costs and the worker’s marginal revenue
product is increasing in worker’s bargaining power β.
5E f ﬁciency
We now consider the efﬁciency implications of differing degrees of product market compe-
tition under individual bargaining. This allows us to make more precise the countervailing
effects of monopoly power on the one hand, and the hiring and search externalities on
the other. Any setup where ﬁrms take their product market power into account will lead
to underprovision of goods, and hence underhiring. At the same time ﬁrms in individual
bargaining settings have an incentive to overhireand thus overproduce(Stole and Zwiebel,
1996), which may counteract some of the monopoly distortions. Thus, one might see indi-
vidual bargaining as inducing monopolistically competitive ﬁrms to ’self-regulate’ and in-
crease output, bringing them closer to the efﬁcient level implied by perfect competition.22
In the following, we examine the joint efﬁciency properties of monopolistic competition
and individual bargaining.
To focus on this tension between monopolistic underprovision of goods and overhir-
ing due to individual bargaining, we choose per capita aggregate output as the planner’s
objective. Maximizing output rather than a utility measure allows us to abstract from the
role that increasing our competition measure σ plays in increasing utility via an increase
in product variety.23 The social planner maximizes per capita aggregate output, subject to
22See also the discussion in Pissarides (2000) pages 198–201.
23In the working paper version, we hold demand elasticity across differentiated goods σ constant, and vary
competition by varying the number of ﬁrms per industry. In this case, maximizing output per capita is equivalent
to maximizing utility per capita for a given value of σ. Alternatively, one could follow Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) and add a term which is inversely related to σ to the utility function, which neutralizes any increase in
utility from an increase in product variety.
16matching frictions. Total output of the economy can simply be written as AH where H is
aggregate employment. Since H =( 1−u), per capita output is given by A(1−u). Using our
deﬁnition of labor market tightness we can write economy wide per-period vacancy post-
ing costs as ΦVθu so that the per period social welfare function becomes A(1−u)−ΦVθu. To
focus on the monopoly, bargaining and matching distortions, we consider the special case











{A(1−ut)−ΦVθtut +µt[ut+1−ut −χ(1−ut)+θtq(θt)ut]} (34)
where µt denotes the shadow value of an extra vacancy. From the ﬁrst order condition for






for all t (35)
where η denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to θ, i.e. η = −
θq (θ)
q(θ) .
Combining the ﬁrst order conditions for θt and ut+1 using the envelope condition and im-











Bycomparing (36)totheequilibrium condition ofthemonopolistic competition-individual
bargaining economy (23), we ﬁnd two conditions for constrained efﬁciency.
Result When b = δ = 0, social efﬁciency is attained in the monopolistic competition -
individual bargaining economy if and only if both:
1. β = η, the standard Hosios condition;
2.
σ−β
σ−1 = 1, which reﬂects the monopoly distortion (through σ) and the overhiring effect
(via β).
Given that the Hosios condition holds, there are two cases in which the monopolis-
tic competition - individual bargaining economy attains constrained efﬁciency. First, the
monopoly distortion clearly disappears in the perfect competition limit, as σ → ∞. Sec-
ond, under imperfect competition (ﬁnite σ), constrained efﬁciency is also attained when
workers have all the bargaining power, so that β = 1.24 Effectively, giving workers all the
bargaining power allows the overhiring effect to fully counteract the monopoly distortion.
The intuition is that when workers have all of the bargaining power, wages are very high
and the overhiring effect strongest. At lower levels of bargaining power, β < 1, the hiring
externality is diminished, only allowing individual bargaining to partially counteract the
monopoly distortion. 25
The search friction, as reﬂected in the Hosios condition, is neutralized whenever β = η.
Recalling that the RHS of both the efﬁcient equilibrium condition (36) and its individual
bargaining counterpart (23) are increasing in θ, β, and η, we can infer that for η < β the
search friction causes unemployment to be above its efﬁcient level. However, for η > β the
search friction implies a lower-than optimal level of unemployment.
Hence, our speciﬁcation of η = β < 1 unambiguously leads to inefﬁciently low em-
ployment levels. In this case, the search friction is neutralized, while the net effect of the
24It should be that in order for social efﬁciency to obtained under β = 1, the matching function must also be
degenerate with elasticity η = 1.
25Our ﬁndings are consistent with Smith (1999), who studies social efﬁciency for the case of perfect competi-
tion and decreasing returns to scale, and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) who study perfect competition and constant
returns to scale.
17monopoly and individual bargaining distortions is unemployment which is greater than
the efﬁcient level. Similarly, whenever either η < β ≤ 1 or η ≤ β < 1, both the net effect of
the monopoly and individual bargaining distortions and the search friction imply under-
employment, leading to an equilibrium level of unemployment which is unambiguously
greater than the efﬁcient level. However, for β < η < 1, the search friction implies overem-
ployment whereas the monopoly distortion still suggests underemployment. Given that
the two distortions work in opposite directions, it is not clear in this last case whether the
level of unemployment will be too low or too high in the decentralized equilibrium as
compared to the efﬁcient outcome.
6 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to study the relationship between product mar-
ket regulation and labor market outcomes. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we
develop a dynamic model with imperfect competition and search frictions, which is well
suited for the quantitative analysis of the present paper. Our model contains the interesting
feature that the standard monopoly distortion of underproduction is partially offset by an
overhiring incentive, especially when monopoly power is high.
We then useour model to askwhether the Carter/Reaganderegulationofthe late1970’s
and early1980’scould account for the subsequent decline in UStrend unemployment rates.
We ﬁnd that increasing entry costs to their 1978 levels leads to a surprisingly small increase
in unemployment of less than two tenths of one percentage point, compared to an increase
of two full percentage points in the data.
Thus, while our qualitativeﬁnding thatproductmarketderegulationhas positive reper-
cussions on labor market outcomes is in accordancewith the previous literature, we are the
ﬁrst to quantify the effect of deregulation in a fully microfounded dynamic model and
conclude that this effect is substantially smaller than previously conjectured.
We do, however, ﬁnd that product market deregulation could lead to substantial in-
creases in real wages, supportive of political economy arguments in favor of combining
labor and product market reform found in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). In sum, un-
der individual bargaining, we ﬁnd that product market reform alone is not sufﬁcient to
generate large improvements in labor market outcomes.
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20Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof We need to establish that ∂θ




























The ﬁrst term and the numerator of the second term are clearly positive since β ∈ (0,1)
and σ > 1 for equilibrium to exist. For a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching
function q (θ) < 0, so that the denominator is also guaranteed to be positive.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof (i) From (25) and applying Lemma 1, it is straightforward to show that ∂u
∂σ <0 when-
ever q(θ)+θq (θ) > 0. This latter condition holds for all Cobb-Douglas constant returns to
scale matching functions.


















where the last inequality is due to Lemma 1 and the fact that q (θ) < 0 for any CRS Cobb-
Douglas matching function.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3





∂  χ are all negative. In each case, we





∂θ where x is the
relevant parameter and derivatives are taken with respect to the RHS of (23). It is easy to
see that the denominator is positive for all constant returns to scale matching functions, so
it remains to establish that the numerator
∂[·]











































































∂r can be shown to be positive by combining (i) with Lemma 1. For ∂u














∂  χ [θq (θ)+q(θ)]
[χ+θq[θ]]
2
In both cases, the denominator is clearly positive, as is the ﬁrst term of the numerator. It
remains to show that the second term of the numerator is negative: this is indeed the case
because we have established in (i) that ∂θ
∂  χ < 0 and because θq (θ)+q(θ) > 0 for CRS Cobb-
Douglas matching functions.












































0. Consider two mutually exclusive cases:
∂[·]
∂β is either decreasing or increasing in σ. In the
former case,
∂[·]
∂β > 0 at σ → ∞ ensures that
∂[·]
∂β > 0 everywhere. We proceed by ﬁrst showing
that
∂[·]
∂β is decreasing in σ whenever b <
ΦV















∂β∂σ < 0 whenever b <
ΦV
1−δθ. This implies that if b <
ΦV
1−δθ, then ∂θ
∂β < 0 and by
Lemma 1 ∂u
∂θ > 0. In the latter, we can use that σ ∈ (1,∞) and check whether
∂[·]
∂β = 0 for
a theshold value   σ which is in the admissible range (1,∞). Setting (37) equal to zero and
solving for   σ gives us:















It is straightforward to see that whenever b >
ΦV
1−δθ, then   σ > 1 - so that
∂[·]
∂β goes negative
for some admissible value of σ ∈ (1,∞). This implies that when b >
ΦV
1−δθ, then ∂θ
∂β ≤ 0 for all
σ ∈ [  σ,∞) and ∂θ
∂β > 0 for all σ ∈ (1,  σ). The rest of the proof follows by applying Lemma 1.
22Appendix B Tables
Table 1: Detailed Entry Costs for 1997
Dataset OECD OECD Djankov, et. al.
Country Days Procedures Index Fees
Australia 5 6.5 12.3 2.1 %
Austria 40 10 35.2 45.4 %
Belgium 30 7 25.6 10.0 %
Denmark 5 2 5.6 1.4 %
Finland 30 7 25.6 1.2 %
France 30 16 39.3 19.7 %
Germany 80 10 55.2 8.5 %
Greece 32.5 28 58.7 48.0 %
Ireland 15 15 30.2 11.4 %
Italy 50 25 62.9 24.7 %
Japan 15 14 28.7 11.4 %
Netherlands 60 9 43.7 19.0 %
Portugal 40 10 35.2 31.3 %
Spain 117.5 17 84.5 12.7 %
Sweden 15 7 18.1 2.5 %
UK 5 4 8.6 0.6 %
United States 7.5 3.5 8.6 1.0 %
The ’Days’ column gives the number of business days necessary to start a new ﬁrm,
while the ’Procedures’ column gives the number of entry procedures which new ﬁrms
must complete. The ’Index’ column combines the ’Days’ and ’Procedures’ measures as
(days + procedures/(ave procedures/day))/2, so that the indexes’ units are days. The
ﬁrst two columns draw on 1997 data from Logotech S.A., as reported by the OECD [Fos-
tering Entrepreneurship] and by Pissarides. (2001). The fourth column gives Djankov,
et.al. (2002)’s measure for fees required for entry in 1997, as a percentage of annual per
capita GDP.
23Table 2: Entry Costs in 1978 and 1998
Source → OECD / Djankov Nicoletti Scarpetta Nicoletti Scarpetta Projected
Units→ Months Index Index Months
Country ↓ 1997 1998 1978 1978
Australia 0.8 1.6 4.5 6.1
UK 0.5 1.0 4.3 5.7
US 0.6 1.4 4.0 5.2
Denmark 0.4 2.9 5.6 8.1
Finland 1.4 2.6 5.6 8.1
Sweden 1.2 2.2 4.5 6.1
Austria 7.1 3.2 5.2 7.3
Belgium 1.3 3.1 5.5 7.9
France 4.2 3.9 6.0 8.8
Germany 3.7 2.4 5.2 7.3
Greece 8.6 5.1 5.7 8.3
Ireland 2.8 4.0 5.7 8.3
Italy 6.0 4.3 5.8 8.4
Japan 2.7 2.9 5.2 7.3
Netherlands 4.4 3.0 5.3 7.5
Portugal 5.4 4.1 5.9 8.6
Spain 5.6 3.2 4.7 6.4
The ﬁrst column summarizes the entry costs of the previous table, by adding up the
entry delay (as a fraction of a year) and the fees (as a fraction of annual per capita GDP)
and then converting to months by multiplying by 12 to obtain a composite entry cost
measure for 1997. The second and third columns present the product market reguation
indices reported in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) for 1998 and 1978. The correlation
between the 1997 entry-cost based ﬁgures and the 1998 index is 0.78. The ﬁnal column
takes the 1978 index values and projects them onto entry costs, using the coefﬁcients
obtained from a regression of the 1998 index values onto the 1997 entry costs. This gives
us an estimate of 1978 entry costs.
αβ
Estimated coefﬁcient -2.09 1.81




Table 3: Regression of Entry Costs and Product Market Regulation Index
24Table 4: Calibration to US Data
Interpretation Source
β 0.50 Worker bargaining power standard
η 0.50 Elasticity of the matching function standard
A98 1 Average labor productivity 1998 normalization
A78 0.85 Average labor productivity 1978 real GDP growth data
r 0.33 % Annual interest rate 4.0 % annual rate
b 0.47 Real unemployment beneﬁts 50 % replacement rate
δ 0.8 % Probability of ﬁrm exit micro-data
λw 0.45 Job ﬁnding rate Shimer (2005)
λf
1
4.2 Job ﬁlling rate den Haan et. al. (2000)
θ 1.89 Labor market tightness θ = λw
λf
s 0.33 Scaling parameter of matching function s = λw
θ1−η
ΦV,98 0.24 Real vacancy posting cost, 1998 u = 5.1%
ΦV,78 0.24·A78 Real vacancy posting cost, 1978 balanced growth
χ 2.4 % Total separation rate u =
χ
χ+λw
Table 5: Baseline Results
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978





Replacement rate 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.47 0.45
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.89 1.79
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 81.4 9.1
Markup 0.6 % 6.2 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.94 0.89
Res. Utility rVU 0.91 0.86
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.03 0.03
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.4 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.24 0.24·A78
25Table 6: Robustness to Job-Finding Rate λw
θq(θ)= 1
3.2 mean u duration θq(θ)= 1
1.5 median u duration
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.24 % 5.1 % 5.24 %
Unemployment duration 1
θq(θ) 3.2 3.3 1.5 1.5
Vacancy duration 1
q(θ) 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1
Replacement rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.45
Total separation rate χ 1.7 % 1.7 % 3.6 % 3.6 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.31 1.24 2.80 2.65
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 81.9 9.1 81.0 9.1
Markup
1−β
σ−1 0.6 % 6.2 % 0.6 % 6.2 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.89
Res. Utility rVU 0.91 0.86 0.92 0.87
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.4 % 1.3 % 1.4 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.34 0.34·A78 0.16 0.16·A78
Table 7: Robustness to Job-Filling Rate λf
q(θ)=0.10 q(θ)=0.50
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.24 % 5.1 % 5.24 %
Unemployment duration 1
θq(θ) 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3
Vacancy duration 1
q(θ) 10.0 9.7 2.0 1.9
Replacement rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.45
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 4.50 4.25 0.90 0.85
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 81.4 9.1 81.4 9.1
Markup
1−β
σ−1 0.6 % 6.2 % 0.6 % 6.2 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.89
Res. Utility rVU 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.86
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.4 % 1.3 % 1.4 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.10 0.10·A78 0.50 0.50·A78
26Table 8: Robustness to Replacement Rate
rr = 0.30 rr = 0.70
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.24 % 5.1 % 5.23 %
Unemployment duration 1
θq(θ) 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3
Vacancy duration 1
q(θ) 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1
Replacement rate 0.30 0.30 0.70 0.70
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.28 0.27 0.66 0.62
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.89 1.79 1.89 1.79
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 81.9 9.1 80.9 9.1
Markup
1−β
σ−1 0.6 % 6.2 % 0.6 % 6.2 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.89
Res. Utility rVU 0.90 0.85 0.93 0.88
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
Markup 0.6 % 6.2 % 0.6 % 6.2 %
Tax rates τI = τP 0.8 % 0.8 % 1.9 % 1.9 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.33 0.33·A78 0.15 0.15·A78
Table 9: Robustness to Monthly Firm Exit Rate δ
δ = 0.6% δ = 1.0%
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.21 % 5.1 % 5.26 %
Unemployment duration 1
θq(θ) 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3
Vacancy duration 1
q(θ) 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1
Replacement rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.44
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.89 1.81 1.89 1.77
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 98.4 10.9 69.5 7.8
Markup
1−β
σ−1 0.5 % 5.1 % 0.7 % 6.4 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.88
Res. Utility rVU 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.85
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.4 % 1.3 % 1.4 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.24 0.24·A78 0.24 0.24·A78
27Table 10: Robustness to Matching Elasticity η = β
β = η = 0.30 β = η = 0.72
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.30 % 5.1 % 5.17 %
Unemployment duration 1
q(θ) 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3
Vacancy duration 1
θq(θ) 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.0
Replacement rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.30 0.30 0.72 0.72
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.45
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.89 1.78 1.89 1.79
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 115.7 12.4 45.6 5.5
Markup
1−β
σ−1 0.6 % 6.1 % 0.6 % 6.2 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.91 0.86 0.96 0.91
Res. Utility rVU 0.88 0.83 0.93 0.88
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.4 % 1.3 % 1.4 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.54 0.54·A78 0.09 0.09·A78
Table 11: Robustness to Higher Markups: Additive γa
γa = 3.5 γa = 7.1
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.24 % 5.1 % 5.25 %
Unemployment duration 1
q(θ) 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3
Vacancy duration 1
θq(θ) 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1
Replacement rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.30
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.41
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.89 1.78 1.89 1.78
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 10.9 5.5 6.0 4.0
Markup
1−β
σ−1 5.0 % 11.1 % 10.0 % 16.7 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.81
Res. Utility rVU 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.79
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.4 % 1.3 % 1.4 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22
28Table 12: Robustness to Higher Markups: Multiplicative γm
γm = 3.42 γm = 6.10
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978 ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment u(σ∗) 5.1 % 5.64 % 5.1 % 6.25 %
Unemployment duration 1
q(θ) 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.8
Vacancy duration 1
θq(θ) 4.2 3.8 4.2 3.4
Replacement rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Matching elasticity η = β 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Real unemployment beneﬁt b 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.28
Total separation rate χ 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.4 %
Labor market tightness θ(σ∗) 1.89 1.53 1.89 1.23
Equ. demand elasticity σ∗ 11.0 2.7 6.0 1.8
Markup
1−β
σ−1 5.0 % 29.4 % 10.0 % 62.5 %
Real net wage w
P (1−τI) 0.90 0.73 0.86 0.56
Res. Utility rVU 0.88 0.71 0.84 0.54
Worker’s Match Surplus 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Tax rates τI = τP 1.3 % 1.5 % 1.3 % 1.6 %
Vacancy costs ΦV 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22
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Figure 1: US HP-Trend Unemployment and Regulation Data
Source: BLS and Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2002























Figure 2: Firm Level Equilibrium Wages and Employment



























Figure3: Contributions ofOutputExpansionandOverhiringtoEquilibrium Tightness: The
solid line shows the impact of competition on equilibrium labor market tightness θ that is
solely due to the output expansion effect, that is, when the hiring externality has been shut
down by setting
σ−β
σ = 1. Accordingly, the dashed line shows the impact of competition
on θ that can be attributed solely to the hiring externality, i.e. when the output expansion
effect has been shut down by setting σ
σ−1 = 1.


















































Figure 4: Entry Regulation and naive Labor Shares.
Data on compensation/GDP is taken from Gollin (2002), Table 2, column 4. Data on entry regulation
is the regulation index of Fonseca et al. (2001), table 2, column 4, multiplied by 5 to convert to days.
The negative correlation is highly signiﬁcant even for the small number of observations. This plot is






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Quantifying the Overhiring Effect: The solid line shows the impact of competition
on equilibrium unemployment (or wages). The dotted line shows how competition affects











































































































η = β = 0.75
with Overhiring
no Overhiring
Figure 7: Quantifying Overhiring for Various η = β Values: The solid line in each panel
shows the impact of competition on equilibrium unemployment. The dotted lines show




36Appendix D DerivationoftheWageCurve: SolvingtheDif-
ferential Equation






























where C denotes some constant of integration. The ﬁrst term of the integrand is easily



























































which gives equation 15 of the text. The condition to pin down the constant of integration
is discussed in Cahuc et al. (2004)who assume that the wage remains ﬁnite as Hi →0 which
implies C = 0. This condition is sensible. We know that in the limit of perfect competition
σ → ∞ the wage curve must coincide with the standard wage curve of the one-worker ﬁrm
because the marginal revenue product is constant. Furthermore we also obtain that in the
limit of β → 0 the workers are only paid their reservation wages.
37Appendix E Summary of Equations











































5. Firm Level Employment
by combining Goods demand and good supply;
• General Equilibrium – Short Run: θ,I,u,H,τI,τp






Pi = Pj = 1
3. Beveridge Curve
(1−u)χ= uθq(θ)














• General Equilibrium – Long Run: σ
1. Entry Costs
ΦE =( d+ f)I
2. Free Entry Condition
ΦE +
ΦV
q(θ)
H =VJ